The growth of transparency has been a new development whose implications for global politics are still being keenly felt. 1 The broader implications of the transparency revolution are being mapped by some scholars (Florini 2005; Lord 2006; Sperling 2009 ). This, in turn has also opened the door to more mid-range scholarship. Since 1997, the IMF has responded to the transparency revolution by allowing countries to increasingly make publicly available information about their respective Article IV consultations. These consultations are held roughly annually for IMF members, and they are part of the IMF's broader mandate to ensure that national policies aimed at generating growth do not produce negative externalities. Countries initially had the option to allow the Fund to issue a press release (known as a Public Information Notice or PIN) describing the key findings from the consultation. Starting in 1999, countries could issue the actual staff report that the Fund's Article IV team prepares for the IMF Executive Board.
Since 1997, IMF surveillance has become increasingly transparent. In 2010, 89 percent of the countries that had an Article IV consultation released their respective staff reports. While the growth of this transparency speaks to broader questions, our goals in this paper are more modest: does transparency make a difference? To answer this question, we explore the effects of information release about Article IV consultations on the behavior of financial markets. Specifically, we explore the effects of greater transparency on spreads on emerging market debt. We find that controlling for the reasons why states are transparent turns out to be of substantive importance. We also find that markets reward those countries that release information from their respective Article IV consultations with lower interest rates on their sovereign debt.
The paper below is divided into five sections. First, we discuss importance the broader importance of this research question. Second, we provide additional background on IMF surveillance and how it has changed over time. Third, we outline a research design aimed at 1 This research is supported by National Science Foundation Grant SES-0960422. Thanks are due to Darren Sweeper and Eleanor Xu.
answering our question. Findings appear in the fourth section, and the final section concludes with some of the bigger lessons from this project as well as implications for future research.
Transparency: What do we know? What do we need to know?
Few would dispute that the world is more transparent now than in the past. Whether the transparency revolution is remaking world politics, however, is up for dispute. Florini (2005) suggests that transparency-based governance offers the potential for reshaping global politics by reducing the barriers to create a strong global civil society. This in turn will help legitimate international organizations like the IMF and World Bank. Whether this actually happens, however, is a function of the strength of the commitment to transparency, which can be rolled back (as in the case of the US after 9/11) or carefully inscribed (as in the case of limited rules about information release about procedures in both the Fund and the Bank).
Not surprisingly, the case for transparency optimism has engendered some pushback. Lord (2006) notes that the link between transparency and accountability can be undone as actors manipulate information. Just because the world is more transparent does not necessarily mean that countries faithfully reveal their private information. On the contrary, countries can reveal faulty information or propaganda.
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In the economics literature, there are similar concerns about transparency. The literature on central bank communication is a classic setting in which information revealed to strategic actors can pose problems. Geraats (2002) and Dincer and Eichengreen (2007) The most recent Article IV report concluded for the United States at the height of the debt crisis, for example, used the word "unsustainable" with reference to the deficit and debt seven times, and it recommended a national sales tax or value added tax as well as cutting Social Security and raising the retirement age. Some of these ideas will never be met with an actual proposal by the White House or
Congress.
The lack of consequences for breaching soft law often leads to the implication that it is inconsequential. Hard law, by contrast, is more precise and creates higher levels of obligation. Of course, by design, if soft law were inconsequential, we would not expect the IMF to debate whether to make transparency more encompassing, as it historically has. We would also not expect countries to opt-out of what seems to be a growing and costless international standard. Before we can address these larger questions, more background about how IMF surveillance has changed over time is necessary. This is the subject of our next section. The original concerns about increasing transparency were based on the idea that revealing too much information to markets, specifically about exchange rate policy, would destabilize them (James 1996:274) . After all, a strong public signal from the Fund that a country's exchange rate is unsustainable is likely to produce a run on the currency and force a devaluation. Rather than discuss exchange rates directly, staff reports discussed whether monetary and fiscal policy was largely consistent with the exchange rate policy (Boughton 2001:90) . The Fund moved to allow the release of PINs following country approval, since some countries were already releasing information from the Article IV team's wrap-up meeting with country authorities (Boughton 2001:101) . Consistent with the Fund's concern that too much transparency would destabilize markets rather than reassure them, the IMF sought to develop guidelines for carefully tempering the language used in the PIN.
Since the PIN effectively expresses the opinions of the Executive Board, an organization that operates under a norm of consensus, the Fund uses qualifiers to summarize the extent of agreement or disagreement on any one issue. For example, the use of the phrase "a few" may refer to the opinions of two to four Executive Directors, "some" refers to the opinions of five to six Executive Directors, and so on. The result is a particularly unique form of Fundspeak. Executive Board created an explicit policy regarding deletions from the reports, which limited them solely to information regarding exchange rates and interest rates that is market sensitive. Countries can refuse to have the staff report published, and they can also refuse to allow a PIN to be released. The process of releasing data underscores an important insight about its content. Many elements of the Article IV reports contain private information. The historical data in Article IV reports can be found in standard IMF and World Bank data sources. The current data in Article IV reports, by contrast, has yet to be released into standard IMF and World Bank data sources. The projections of future trends (in country debt and reserves, for example) are information that would not have been made public by the Fund prior to 1997. In addition, the Fund's overall assessment of the state of the country's economy is also something that was only shared with the country being consulted prior to 1997. The fact that countries do try to edit findings from Article IV consultations suggests that the content of the reports can be controversial, and that the IMF is releasing information that was previously unavailable to markets.
Over time, the norm of making the findings of Article IV consultations public has strengthened. Between July 1999 and June 2001, 83% of country PINs were published, and 47% of the Article IV staff reports were published. Between November 2007 and December 2008, 97% of PINs were published, and 82% of Article IV staff reports were published. So, at a global level, not only has there been more transparency over time, but also transparency has become more substantive. In this paper, we focus on a sample of 22 emerging markets countries. The evolution of transparency in these countries in our sample appears in Figure One below.
FIGURE ONE ABOUT HERE
We note that the trends in this sample mirror those in the global discussion above. Malaysia, and Turkey. Venezuela, in contrast, has released none of its PINs and none of its staff reports. 5 The important thing to underscore about this is that while there is a general trend toward greater transparency suggested by Figure One, this masks a considerable degree of variation.
Accounting for this variation is the subject of our next section -in which we delve into some of the brutal specifics of the research design. One of the barriers to studying the effects of transparency is the realization that transparency is not exogenous (Bellver and Kaufmann 2005; Edwards, Coolidge, and Preston 2012) . Given that countries (for whatever the reason) choose whether or not to release findings from their consultations, the reasons why they might do this might also be correlated with our main dependent variable of spreads on emerging market debt. For this reason, we need to assess the factors that determine whether or not countries release data, and then assess the unbiased effect of data release on emerging market debt. Failure to do this results in biased coefficients.
Research Design
Our approach to the modeling the effects of transparency is based on two facts. First, countries do not randomly choose to be transparent. Table One demonstrates that transparency is persistent and varies across countries, and the Appendix demonstrates that countries made different choices with regard to when and how (if at all) to be transparent. This means that to assess the effects of transparency, we need to understand why transparency is chosen in the first place. Failing to account for non-random selection here means that we may well underestimate the effects of transparency. Our solution to this problem is to estimate a series of treatment regressions, which account jointly for the decision to release data as well as the effect of data release on our dependent variable. This is a very common methodological approach in estimating the effects of IMF adjustment programs on economic variables (Edwards 2005; Vreeland 2003; Jensen 2004) .
5 In addition, both Argentina and Venezuela have been skipping their Article IV consultations for years.
Second, as the historical overview of surveillance suggests, the nature of Article IV transparency has changed over time. From April 1997 to March 1999, the only option that countries had was whether to have the Fund release a PIN following completion of the Executive Board's review of the consultation. From April 1999 on, countries had a second option to release the staff report as well in addition to the PIN. This means that we need to disaggregate not only whether we're evaluating the effects of PIN or staff report release, but we also need to pay attention to time period effects, since the PIN only and PIN and staff report timeframes are distinct.
We've created a quarterly dataset from the first quarter of 1997 to the fourth quarter of 2008 to help understand the sources and effects of these transparency choices in 22 emerging market countries. We code transparency dichotomously. Countries are classified as transparent starting in the quarter in which they release a PIN or a staff report. If they release a PIN or a staff report in the second half of a given quarter, we count the subsequent quarter as the start of a spell of transparency. Countries remain transparent (and thus each subsequent quarter is coded as one) until they cease to release PINs or staff reports in subsequent Article IV consultations. Information on who has or has not released staff reports and PINs is available in the Annual Reports of the IMF as well as its Triennial Reviews of Surveillance and through the IMF website. Measuring the variable in this way captures the long term effects of transparency, and this approach is used in previously published research (Glennerster and Shin 2008; Fratzscher and Reynaud 2011) . Ascertaining the long-term effects is the strongest route to demonstrating that transparency makes a difference.
Having addressed the selection bias issue, the dependent variable in the effects of transparency model is the quarterly spread on sovereign debt. To best measure cost of capital in developing countries, a price measure is preferable to a measure of capital flows. As a result, we use information from the JP Morgan Emerging Market Bond Index Global (EMBIG) as the dependent variable. Specifically, we will look at the stripped spread, which refers to the difference between the yield on a country's foreign-currency-denominated securities and an equivalent US government bond. For each country, the yield is a composite of the daily return on individual securities traded on the secondary market. Thus, these spreads are available at all times, and not just when bonds are issued. I will use information on sovereign debt instruments only for each country's spread. The spread is calculated in basis points (1/100 of a percentage point). From the standpoint of an emerging market, higher spreads indicate that a country's bonds are more expensive than their US counterparts. As is customary, because the variable ranges from 7.426 to 6626.884, we take the natural logarithm of the spread, which is calculated as a quarterly average. 
Figures Two and Three About Here
To account for changes in the level of spreads, we rely on the extant literature, which focuses on variables such as GDP per capita, inflation, debt service, the current account balance, and growth. These data come from the IMF's International Financial Statistics CD Rom and the World Bank's World Development Indicators. Where necessary, we used a Denton transformation to interpolate annual data into quarterly data. These same independent variables have been found in previous research (Edwards, Coolidge, and Preston 2012) to help us understand decisions to release data in the first place. Thus, we include economic determinants of the transparency decision as well.
All of the economic variables are lagged one quarter. We model the release of PINs and staff reports through separate treatment models. While it is true that countries do not release staff reports if they don't release a PIN, sample selection bias does not appear to be a problem here. Since PIN release is practically universal, it is difficult to argue that a selection effect exists in the staff report model. More fundamentally, analyses using heckman logit models suggest that we cannot reject the hypothesis that the two equations are independent (or, more to the point, that the correlation between the error terms in the PIN release equation and the staff report release equation was equal to zero). Thus, the use of separate models for each stage is eminently defensible.
In the pages below, we discuss the effects of transparency on spreads on emerging market debt in three different models -one for the first years of the PIN release project (up until the first quarter of 1999), one for PIN releases over the entire dataset (from the first quarter of 1997 to the fourth quarter of 2008) and one for Staff Report releases over the entire timeperiod (from the second quarter of 1999 to the fourth quarter of 2008). Following this, we briefly discuss the determinants of transparency across these models, and conclude with broader implications.
Findings (1): Effects of Transparency on Spreads
The models on the effects of PIN releases on spreads during 1997 to 1999 are shown in Table One below. Note that Models Two and Three include regional dummies and year dummies, respectively. These dummy variables were entered in both the data release and the spread equations.
Table One About Here
Working across the three columns, we note that increases in inflation as measured by the Consumer Price Index in each country lead to increases in spreads in the baseline model and the model with regional dummies. The substantive effects of increases in inflation, however, are meager compared to those of other coefficients. Increases in the level of debt service (as measured by debt as a percentage of exports) lead to higher spreads across all three models. Countries with current account surpluses experience statistically significant decreases in spreads across all three models.
Similarly, countries that are growing faster are those with lower spreads; again, this is statistically significant across all three models. Intuitively, these results make sense -since countries with higher levels of inflation and debt service, current account deficits and lower levels of growth are less stable compared to their counterparts with lower inflation, sustainable current accounts and level of debt, and comparatively higher growth.
Turning to the heart of the matter, we note that those countries that release PINs from their respective consultations have lower spreads. This specification holds across all three models: so even after controlling for time period effects and regional differences, more transparent countries have lower spreads on their debt. Because the dependent variable is expressed in natural log form, the substantive effects of the independent variable on the dependent variable are in percentage form.
Taking the lowest coefficient from Table One , then, which is our most conservative estimate of the effect of transparency on spreads, this suggest that countries that release PINs have spreads that are 67% lower than their non-transparent counterparts. In practice, countries had a mean spread of 688 basis points in our sample in 1998, and they had a mean level of public foreign debt equal to 34.72% of GNP in current US dollars. The effect of lowering spreads by 67% translates into a savings of approximately 1.6% of GNP. So transparency generated considerable benefits to those countries that were early adopters of this new standard.
While the first two years of the PIN release program demonstrate that more transparent countries saw the spreads on their foreign debt decline, starting in 1999 countries had the option to release staff reports as well. We would expect having the additional option would reduce the effects of PIN release on spreads, since the status quo is no longer whether or not countries release PINs, but rather whether or not countries release staff reports, given that they've already released PINs. To estimate the overall effects of PIN release on spreads, we present the results for the full sample (including all years between 1997 and 2008) in the table below. Our findings are in line with this premise.
Table Two About Here
As in the previous table, we present three models; the second and third include regional and year dummies in both the selection and outcome equations. We note that a number of control variables are statistically significant -GDP per capita, debt service, and growth. These findings make intuitive sense: wealthier countries have lower spreads than poorer ones, countries with lower levels of debt and higher levels of growth have lower spreads as well. Two findings from the control variables merit additional attention. First, in contrast to Table One , the coefficients on current account balance are now positive across all three models instead of negative. This suggests that countries have higher spreads as their current accounts move into increasing surplus. While we defer a discussion of why these results obtain until a subsequent draft of this paper, we note that preliminary evidence suggests support for a curvilinear relationship between the current account and spreads. 6 Second, we note that we included democracy, as measured by the Polity 2 scale, was included in the spreads models as a control. In one of our three models (the model with year dummies), democracy is positive and statistically significant, suggesting that more democratic countries are those with higher spreads. This finding is statistically significant at a better than .05
level, but is not robust, so we should be wary of inferring implications about a purported "democratic advantage" (Schultz and Weingast 2003; Saeigh 2005 ) from this finding.
We note that here as in Table One that countries that released PINs are those with lower spreads compared to their nontransparent counterparts. The coefficients across all three models are appropriately signed and statistically significant, yet the magnitude of the effect of PIN releases on spreads is smaller in two models in Table Two compared to Table One . It is only in the model with year dummies that we see a more substantive effect of PIN releases over the long term compared to the short term (-.800 compared to -.678).
To calculate the substantive effect of transparency on spreads, then, we repeat the procedure used in Table One . We took the smallest coefficient from Table Two , which is our most conservative estimate of the effect of transparency on spreads. The coefficient for Model Two in These findings have implications for our statistical model. Since there are no instances of countries releasing staff reports instead of PINs, and since the PIN release percentage is 100% for many of the years in our study, we make only the issue of report releases an endogenous variable, and estimate the effects of transparency on spreads using the same treatment regression approach as before. These findings appear in the table below, and tell a similar story.
Table Three About Here
Turning to the control variables in the top half of Table Three , we note that countries with higher levels of inflation (as noted by the Consumer Price Index) have higher spreads, and poorer countries (as noted by levels of GDP per capita) have higher spread. Countries with higher levels of debt service and lower levels of growth all have higher spreads as well. As in Table Two , we see a direct relationship with spreads and the current account. Those countries with current account surpluses are those with higher spreads. Again, understanding this result is a topic that we defer to a subsequent iteration of the paper.
7 Edwards and Goldfrank (2012) find a strong divergence of data release patterns across Latin America, as the percentage of staff report releases has gone down across the region over time.
Looking at the coefficients for staff report release in Table Three , we note that these are smaller in two of the three models in Table Two . In Model Two in Table Three, the difference between PINs and Staff reports is only two-tenths of one percentage point. The coefficients in Table Three tell us that the release of an Article IV staff report reduces spreads by between 29 and 43 percent. 8 To calculate the substantive effect of transparency on spreads, then, we repeat the procedure used above. We took the lowest coefficient from Table Three , which is our most conservative estimate of the effect of transparency on spreads. The coefficient for Model Three in Table Three (estimated with year dummies) suggests that countries that release staff reports have spreads that are 29% lower than their non-transparent counterparts. In practice, countries had a mean spread of 688 basis points in our sample in 1998, and they had a mean level of public foreign debt equal to 34.72% of GNP in current US dollars. The effect of lowering spreads by 29%
translates into a savings of approximately .693% of GNP.
Across all nine models, then, we find strong effects for transparency regarding IMF surveillance on spreads on developing country debt. These results are robust to alternative specifications, hold across different levels of transparency between PIN and staff report releases, and hold whether we focus on short-term or long-term effects. The benefits of transparency for developing countries, then, seem apparent.
In this project, we have framed transparency as a choice. Countries are not randomly assigned to be transparent or non-transparent. This raises the issue of what factors shape this transparency, and we turn to this issue below.
Findings (2): Determinants of Transparency
In the bottom panel of each table, we estimate models of PIN and staff report release. These models are based on previous work (Edwards, Coolidge, and Preston 2012) that evaluate PIN and staff report release using a global sample of IMF member countries. Each of these models include a series of cubic spline segments to address autocorrelation in data release (following Beck, Katz, and Tucker 1998). Rather than recapitulate every finding in these nine tables, we calculated the substantive effects for Model One in each table for each of the substantive coefficients. These appear in the table below.
Table Four About Here
In the model for the first two years of PIN releases, we find that those countries that release data are those that are growing slower and those that have current account deficits. These findings don't reflect a conventional story about signaling types: all other things being equal, we would expect countries with exceptional economic performance to release reports so as to let the rest of the world know about it. This doesn't fit a story about signaling economic strength, but rather one about signaling reassurance.
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In Model Two, which covers PIN releases from 1997 to 2008, we find a different story.
Here the countries that are more likely to release data are those that have current account surpluses, which fits a conventional story about signaling economic strength. We also find a positive relationship with levels of democracy: those countries that are more democratic are likely to release
PINs. The substantive effect of increasing levels of democracy, however, is modest. Holding all the other variables constant, increasing a country's level of democracy from its minimum to its 9 Edwards, Coolidge, and Preston (2012) found similar results in a global sample of PIN releases from 1997 to 1999 based on annual data.
maximum increases the probability of data release by 3 percent. 10 This would mean changing a country's political system from that of China to that of Hungary. We also found evidence of strong regional effects -which we calculated by measuring the lagged percentage of data release by other countries in the region over time. Having other countries in one's region release data increases the probability that other countries emulate and release PINs.
Finally, the rightmost column reports the findings from the model of staff report release. As before, countries with lower levels of debt are more likely to release staff reports, suggesting incentives to release data are based on economic strength. We also find that wealthier countries are less likely to release than poorer countries in these data, and again find strong support for regional effects. Countries seek to emulate the behavior of other emerging markets in their region, and peer competitor adoption of transparency creates incentives for other countries in the region to also choose transparency.
Overall, each of these models has good fit to the data, correctly predicting between 82 and 93 percent of the observations. In addition, each of these statistical models offers a means for us to test whether controlling for the endogeneity of transparency is appropriate. Because this endogeneity manifests itself as a correlation in the error terms between the data release and spread models, we test if this correlation is statistically different than zero. Tests of significance of this correlation coefficient all suggest that this two stage model represents an ideal econometric solution to the substantive problem.
Conclusions
The answer to the question posed in the title of the paper is a clear yes: transparency makes a difference for emerging markets. Four implications follow for further research. First, while most emerging markets have embraced transparency to varying degrees, two Latin American countriesArgentina and Venezuela, have opted out of the surveillance process altogether. The empirical work here suggests that the costs of their disengagement from the Article IV process are considerable.
While emerging markets are providing the bulk of the growth in the world economy, both of these countries are clearly bearing the costs of avoiding surveillance. The broader point remains, however, that this exclusion, which represents conscious choices by both countries, is not without costs.
Second, this project demonstrates that different forms of transparency are consequential.
Staff Reports are certainly more informational than PINs, and it is no accident that they are less likely to be released by countries. This raises the question of exactly what the difference is between these two that is responsible for the difference in information release. Edwards and Goldfrank (2012) find that the growing divergence in release rates of PINs and Staff Reports is attributable to the content of the reports. Specifically, left governments are sensitive to the Fund's evaluation of fiscal policy, and are less likely to release staff reports that are critical of government spending levels.
This finding carries with it implications for how future transparency systems ought to be designed.
Third, on the issue of the sources of transparency, more research is necessary. The approach to modeling domestic politics was intentionally austere, and it is perhaps no accident that we found little support for regime type as an explanation relative to state of the economy and regional incentives to emulate behavior. More work is necessary to understand the determinants of the domestic political incentives. At the present, it appears that any domestic incentives are swamped by a desire to converge to a standard set by other emerging markets in the region.
Finally, more work is needed to connect these findings to the rest of the literature on the IMF. An extensive literature exists on the presence of geopolitical biases in IMF lending. If great power influence can shape the nature of IMF lending and conditionality, then it should certainly matter for choices regarding transparency and the effects of that transparency on markets. Since the IMF is not politically blind, and does treat US allies differently than its adversaries, more attention to geopolitical influence is essential to develop an actual picture of the Fund's influence over member country economies. 
